讲座题目：Regressive Subsidy to EHI and Entrepreneurial Talent Allocation
报告人：冯志钢助理教授（美国内布拉斯加州立大学奥马哈校区）
时间：2017年5月16日 (周二) 9:00-11:00
地点：文泉北楼208会议室
主持人：张广科
报告人简介
冯志钢教授，2009年获得迈阿密大学经济学博士。其研究领域主要涉及定量宏观经济学、财政学、劳动经济学、卫生经济学等。现任美国内布拉斯加州立大学奥马哈校区经济系副教授。2009年至2012年在苏黎世大学银行与金融系任博士后研究员。2012年8月至2013年6月任教于美国普度大学经济系，2013年8月至2016年6月任教于美国伊利诺伊大学香槟分校经济系。期间应邀访问美国联邦储备银行圣路易斯研究所多次，从事宏观财政政策研究。
其在国际学术期刊 International Economic Review, Quantitative Economics, Review of Economic Dynamics, Economic Theory, Mathematical Methods in Operational Research 等期刊发表论文8篇。应邀在国际知名大学、学术会议宣读论文3次。应邀为国际权威经济学期刊审理学术文章20余次。
摘要
Americans who obtain health insurance coverage through employment do not currently pay income or payroll taxes on this benefit. Tax-deductible employer-based health insurance (EHI) is regressive, and we show that this tax policy can help correct misallocation between self-employment and firm employment. Agents face idiosyncratic health risk and have heterogeneous ability as workers or entrepreneurs, and choose their occupation. Linking employment and health insurance creates a wedge between the marginal cost and benefit of EHI and employment at a firm. In equilibrium, some highly skilled individuals with adverse health shocks leave entrepreneurship while individuals with intermediate skills but favorable health shocks opt to manage firms. In the presence of imperfect information on private agent's health risk and managerial ability, and in the absence of perfectly discriminating taxes, a regressive tax subsidy for entrepreneurs to purchase health insurance helps correct distortions associated with non-contractible heterogeneity in managerial talent and health shocks. The subsidy makes entrepreneurship a more (less) attractive option for the highly (medium) skilled unhealthy (healthy) agents as such a policy increases (reduces) net-tax entrepreneurial income. Consequently, this tax policy provides an additional incentive (disincentive) for the first (second) type to be an entrepreneur, hence improving talent allocation. For a dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to the US economy, we find that the welfare gain from improved talent allocation outweighs the loss due to reduced risk sharing associated with the regressive subsidy.